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How does one understand a sentence, in particular its syntactic 
structure? We have reason to think that the competence, in 
particular the parser in the competence analyses the sentence, and 
ends up with some mental equivalent of the tree diagram. And this 
is the main job to be done. If competence is doing this, then it plays 
the main role. If Dunja admits this, how can she be an ordinarist, 
rather that a competentialist? If Devitt agrees with her, how can he 
be an ordinarist? Alternatively, further research might show that 
competence does also issue a verdict, and I hope this is what will 
happen. My reason for thinking it is that I think competence 
participates in other linguistic tasks, in particular in immediate 
linguistic understanding. The ordinarists about linguistic intuitions 
suggest that „given what else we know about the mind“ we should 
believe that ordinary human central processor can read SDs of 
complicated sentences with more than one embedding, and that it 
is just our general intelligence that deciphers them. It is argued 
that this proposal is quite unconvincing. !
Keywords: linguistic competence, linguistic production, 
ordinarism, competentionalism !
First, lot of thanks to Dunja, for her support, patience and understanding. 
It is thanks to her constant help over three and a half decades that 
philosophy of language emerged as a subject first in the philosophy 
department in Zadar (in early eightees), and then in Maribor and Rijeka, 
as well as in the IUC conferences-courses in Dubrovnik, where she has 
managed, with the help of Devitt, of course, to recruit some of the best 
known names in the field. We have discussed philosophy of language and 
linguistics endlessly, and I sadly miss her presence in Maribor and Rijeka 
now. 
Now, to the work. Let me start with the common ground. First, at the 
totally general methodological level Dunja, Michael and I agree that 
explanation of intuition is one of the main desiderata of the work on 
methodology. And we agree about a broadly naturalistic framework as the  
145
!
MIŠČEVIĆ'S REPLY TO DUNJA JUTRONIĆ !
NENAD MIŠČEVIĆ 
Nenad Miščević
desideratum on explanation. And indeed, we all accept that the 
framework should be generous, compatible with commonsense as far as 
possible; we avoid eliminativist naturalism, and look for compromises. I 
had originally started more on a non-naturalistic side of ordinary 
language philosphy and moved to Davidsonian approach; then I have 
learned a lot about more naturalistic alternative from discussing issues of 
naturalistic semantics with both Dunja and Michael (my further source of 
inspiration was Dretske). Let me briefly propose a division of approaches 
in philosophy of language, in relation to naturalism, mentioning some 
examples. 
Of course, I believe that my MoVoC proposal goes well with naturalism; 
it is broadly Chomskyan and Chomsky has always been a naturalist. 
Let me now pass to the main issues . Let me again start with the common 
ground, in more specific areas. Here is Dunja:  
We can take it as agreed by both sides that the first stage is a 
normal production of the sentence, i. e. the actual linguistic 
production (primary linguistic data - pld) by the competence, but 
then Nenad adds that the sentence is being rehearsed and analyzed 
by Ann’s competence (...), which is not accepted by the ordinarist.  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In other words, Nenad is claiming that competence presumably 
comes out with some kind of answer, some Yes or No signal about 
the sentence, and he argues that this is the most important element, 
the core, of the final intuition. However, to repeat, what is agreed 
upon by both sides (competentionalist’s and ordinarist’s) is only 
that the first state/step is a linguistic production. The doubtful part 
in Nenad's interpretation is "…and analyzed by Ann's 
competence." Obviously the parser in the competence has to “make 
decisions,” that is analyze in order to come out with a sentence that 
linguist usually presents in a tree-like diagram but that does NOT 
mean that the competence comes out "with some kind of answer, 
some yes or no signal" about the sentence. 
We should then distinguish the two levels: dealing with the proposed 
sentence, at the object-level, and reaching the verdict about its 
grammaticality, at the meta-level. 
Dunja follows Devitt in his claim that intuitive judgments about 
language, like intuitive judgments in general, ‘are empirical theory-laden 
central-processor responses to phenomena, differing from many other 
such responses only in being fairly immediate and unreflective, based on 
little if any conscious reasoning’ (2006a: 103; see the references in 
Devitt's paper). Let us discuss her version of the story. 
Object level first. I admitt of having been unclear in my formulation of 
the stages, in particular Stage 1 below. Here is the shematic picture again: 
Let me try again, and make the picture of the Stage 1 richer. The context  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of my proposal was given by the issue of the recognition of gramaticality 
of some given sentence: “ Intuitions reported are formulated in an austere 
vocabulary, featuring mainly “acceptable” vs. “non-acceptable””, I write in 
my (2009) paper. 
I have started from the assumption that the native speaker's cognitive 
mechanism goes into simulating the production of the sentence. I was 
even then thinking that there might be other contexts, and other activities 
of the mechanism; now Devitt has made clear that he is particularly 
interested in the linguistic „perception“, and I am addressing that context 
in my reply to him. 
Here, I propose to stay within the original context of recognizing 
(un-)gramaticality. We first look at the object level. Dunja joins Devitt's 
criticism that I have not explained how competence moves from 
production of correct strings to a Yes or No signal” about the acceptability 
of these strings. Dunja agrees with me that  
" Obviously the parser in the competence has to “make decisions,” 
that is analyze in order to come out with a sentence that linguist 
usually presents in a tree-like diagram... 
She is more cautious in the context of the litmus analogy: 
Let us ask ourselves: What is the purpose (job) of litmus? How 
does litmus function? The job of litmus is to show color (red) just 
as the job of competence is to produce sentences (the language 
usage). Thus Nenad begs the question to suppose its job is more 
than that. The so-called information that Nenad mentions in litmus 
case is simply the mere workings of litmus just as the so-called 
information of competence is to produce sentences. Just as you 
cannot but hear the words of your language in the same way you 
cannot but see red in the case of litmus. 
Litmus does not show by itself that the liquid is acidic; the lab-person has 
to know that redness corresponds to acidity. But even here, the crucial 
new info is being brought by litmus. She almost agrees a few sentences 
later: 
Nenad further continues: Let us assume that the person 
successfully produces the sentence. Is not that success like the 
information about the color of litmus? My answer is: Yes, sure it is 
- but this is part of the production - either of litmus or of 
competence - which does not carry with it any judgement! 
But this is all I need at the object-level. The „parser in the competence“ 
analyses the sentence, and ends up with some mental equivalent of the 
tree diagram. And this is the main job to be done. If competence is doing 
this, then it plays the main role. And if Dunja admits this, how can she be 
an ordinarist, rather that a competentialist? If Devitt agrees with here, 
how can he be an ordinarist?  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Alternatively, further research might show that competence does also 
issue a verdict, and I hope this is what will happen. My reason for 
thinking it is that I think competence participates in other linguistic tasks, 
in particular in immediate linguistic understanding. 
Now take the understanding of co-reference: 
(1) John seems to Bill to want to help himself. 
The only way to come to know that „himself“ refers to John is by 
syntactically parsing the sentence; in other words, one's cognitive 
apparatus needs an SD (structured decription) of its syntax, a tree. 
Competence is the only instance that can produce an SD. Now, which 
instance reads the relevant SD, and suggests that „himself“ refers to 
John? Can in be the CP? I doubt: unless you are Chomsky, you general 
intelligence does not spontaneously read and analyze SDs. I conclude that 
only competence can do it. This yields the picture of the stages of its 
participation that I have sketched in my reply to Devitt above: 
Why think that competence decides about coreference of „John“ and 
„himself“? Because there is nothing else that can do it; we have inference 
to the only explanation available. 
Here I really start wondering about the third objection, common to 
Michael and Dunja:  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So far as I can see, Nenad has not addressed my third point, a point 
also emphasized by Jutronić: whichever way VoC is understood, 
given what else we know about mind, VoC seems most unlikely to 
be true. (Devitt, see the paper above) 
Can it be that „given what else we know about the mind“ we should 
believe that ordinary human central processor can read SDs of 
complicated sentences with more than one embedding, that it is just 
general intelligence that deciphers them? Devitt claims that „although a 
speaker’s competence in a language obviously gives her ready access to 
the data of that language, the data that the intuitions are about, it does not 
give her ready access to the truth about the data; the competence does not 
provide the informational content of the intuition.“ So, the speaker, no 
professional in linguistics, gets from the competence the datum, say an 
SD of a complex sentence. Now, her general intelligence decides if the 
analysis proposed by the competence is true! How does it do it? Does her 
general intelligence understand grammar better than her specialized 
competence? I keep wondering. 
Let us return to the simulation case. How can one be an ordinarist, and 
accept that competence does the very important work? Well, we should 
look at the production of the verdict, Dunja would answer. We thus pass 
to the meta-level. Here is her defense: 
The main hero for the ordinarist is the central processing unit. CP 
has access to the resulting output of a particular competence so, it 
does some reflection about the output, i.e., about the data provided 
by the competence. CP appeals to empirical evidence, the data, 
says the ordinarist. So it is not true, as competentionalist claims, 
that production itself yields the verdict (for example: “the sentence 
is not O.K., “the sentence is not to be said” or “the sentence is 
ambiguous”). It is the central processor that yields that verdict (and 
it decides: “I would not say this” or “the sentence is ambiguous”), 
claims the ordinarist. 
There are two assumptions behind this line of arguing. The first is that 
there should be a sharp separation between the analysis and the verdict, 
the object-level and the meta-level. Dunja makes it clear by criticizing 
my analogy of competence with the spokesperson: 
My answer is the following: Spokesperson indicates how the office 
functions. It does not past judgments on the workings or decision 
of the office. Thus this is an invalid comparison because all it 
shows is how office (equaling competence) functions not how 
judgements follow from the office (competence). In Nenad’s own 
words: Intuitions are a shortcut to the functioning of competence. 
But pure functioning of competence is not in question. The 
question (to repeat) is: Does competence give us judgements about  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its own workings? Now, as it was stressed in the first part of this 
paper, the nature of the parser is to go through the analysis and in 
doing this it has to "make decisions” in order to come out with a 
sentence, but that does not entail that is coming out with the 
intuition about the sentence The same way the spokesperson is not 
commenting on the police reports, she is just passing them on – 
showing how the police functions. Thus contrary to Nenad’s claim 
h i s own compar i son suppor t s o rd inar i s t ’s and no t 
competentionalist’s view of the functioning of linguistic 
competence (police department)! 
Let me stay for a second with the police analogy. The spokesmen 
comments and says: „Joe was killed by Thomas Mair“. That's an object-
level statement. „And we are quite sure this is how things happened“, she 
might add, either spontaneously, or in response to a question. There, she 
has passed to the meta-level, and there is nothing unusual about it. The 
report of the (alleged) fact and the report about the report's epistemic 
standing (that „we“ are sure about it) go naturally together. 
The second assumption is the centrality of the meta-level. CP is the main 
hero, the protagonist, Dunja thinks. What should we think of it? Assume 
that the labor is divided, as Dunja proposes. The parser has analysed the 
sentence. It would then have to present the analyses, the tree, to the CP, 
and the CP would then produce its verdict. Have we any reason to believe 
that people's general intelligence can, all by itself, and with no training, 
read and understand the parsing trees? Dunja has been teaching 
linguistics very competently her whole life, and she knows how much 
extra preparation even very good speakers need in order to even start 
understanding the trees analysing the sentences they produce and/or hear. 
Trees just are complicated. To quote Paulo Coelho's Aleph: “In a forest of 
a hundred thousand trees, no two leaves are alike. And no two journeys 
along the same path are alike.”  
Finally, even if the proposed picture were correct, and the labor were 
divided as Dunja proposes, why would CP be the main hero, the 
protagonist? The main work has been done by the parser in the 
competence. Either there is a good parsing tree of the sentence, and CP is 
being confronted with it, or there is none. Haven't things been hereby 
decided? And indeed by the parser in the competence? 
Let me again state my view. First, in the context of explicit recognition of 
grammaticality, in which the work of the languge module starts by 
simulating theproduction of the sentence, and continues by the parsing 
process, the analytic work is done by the competence, as Dunja agrees. 
Further, the general intelligence, and its equivalent, the CP, does not read 
parsing trees. Therefore, it cannot reach the first verdict. It is then 
reasonable to suppose that the verdict is also reached by specialized 
competence. I conclude that Devitt's hope that „Jutronić (this volume) 
shows that this argument fails“ is a vain hope.  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Let us then pass to explicitly meta-level judgments. To stay with our 
example, the conscious response that „himself“ refers to „John“ certainly 
comes from the CP. But so does the judgment that this piece of paper is 
white. This does not mean that CP can see colors; the judgment of 
whiteness is primarily based on seeing, and nobody claims that CP is the 
protagonist in our seeing colors. Dunja quotes an interesting passage 
from Pim Levelt: 
Psychologists talking about linguistic intuitions say: “It is obvious 
that intuitive judgements are metalinguistic judgements. The object 
of a judgement of grammaticality such as the sentence “John lives 
in town” is good English is a linguistic object (the sentence S), and 
the judgement is made on it as a linguistic object” (Levelt 1974 : 8, 
in his Formal Grammars in Linguistics and Psycholinguistics. Vol. 
III). It is as simple as that. Or more to the point: “…the linguist or 
informant who considers the grammaticality of a sentence tries to 
imagine an actual situation of “primary” performance in order to 
decide whether the sentence “could be said”, i. e. is grammatical. 
Intuitions would then be secondary refections of primary 
performance” (Levelt 1972 : 22= Levelt, W. J. M. „Some 
Psychological Aspects of Linguistic Data“. Linguistische Berichte 
17). 
I have no reasons to disagree. But then comes the ordinarist point: 
Levelt also points out that “there is a complete absence of 
arguments in the literature in favor of the thesis that linguistic 
intuitions reveal the underlying linguistic competence” (1972 : 23), 
and thus stressing that, contrary to the competentionalist’s belief, 
intuitions do not flow directly from competence. One could go on 
citing but this should suffice. The fact that the output of 
competence are sentences, and intuitions are judgements made on 
those sentences is exactly what psychologists and ordinarists claim. 
Competentionalist is wrong because “linguistic intuiting is a kind 
of behavior, rather than a clairvoyant window on linguistic 
competence” (Levelt 1972 : 33; couldn't find the quote-NM) 
The only argument I can discern is that „intuitions do not flow directly 
from competence“. But consider seeing white. The judgment „This is 
white“ is „a kind of behavior“ and it does not flow directly from my eye, 
say from my low level neural structures, mostly in the retina, that detect 
color (rods and cones, bipolar cells and ganlion cells engaged in opponent 
processing). These cells don't make judgments, especially not in 
language, like English or Croatian. Seeing white does not flow directly 
from the eye. It does not mean that it does not flow, and does not mean 
that the main work is not done by visual system, but by CP. It is done by 
the visual system, indeed. The trick is in the word „directly“. But 
directness and indirectness simply do not have the power implicit in the  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trick. If I kill you with a bullet, I didn't kill you „directly“; it's the bullet 
that did the job. But I shall go to prison for manslaughter, not the bullet. 
In short, indirectness is not clearly correlated with the lack of causal 
authorship, so that the „indirect“ cause can be and often is the cause. 
Equally the contrast between the „behaviour“ and the „clairvoyant 
window on linguistic competence“ is unclear: isn't the performance, i.e. 
the behaviour, of a pianist often a clear window, almost a clairvoyant 
window, on her musical competence (and the same for cooking, acting 
and scoring: Ronaldo's scoring is a clear window on his sporting 
competence)?  He is just skeptical about the evidence that competence 1
alone underlies our intuitions. But „M“ in „MoVoC“ stands for 
„Moderate“: the proposal explicitly claims that there might be other 
factors in producing intuitions. To keep the analogy with color, the 
surrounding light can change the apparent color of an object, the same 
way in which contrast classes, priming and the like can change the 
apparent acceptability of a string. 
Let me end with a word of gratitude and praise for Dunja: had it not been 
for her constant prompting I would not have developed even these 
rudiments of my MoVoC proposal; I hope the two of us (or three, with 
Michael's participation) will continue to discuss them, and that the next 
time I shall be able to propose more.
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 In fairness to Levelt is should be noted that he accepts the idea of specialized linguistic 1
competence: !
The status of "competence", therefore, is comparable to the place of the notion 
"intelligence" in psychology. It is a theoretical construct to denote a relatively 
autonomous factor, which underlies a large variety of human behaviours. Such 
constructs have to prove their usefulness. After seven decades of intelligence 
research, there is little doubt about the notion of intelligence in this respect. 
Similarly, "linguistic competence" may prove to be equally efficacious. Just as the 
strong interrelations between different forms of "intelligent behaviour" justify the 
construct "intelligence", empirical facts about relations between various types of 
linguistic performance should justify the notion of "linguistic competence". (1972: 
21).
